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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
 
 Professionalism’s dual role as an independent and dependent variable makes the 
impact of its institutional characteristics on legislator attitudes and behavior important to 
understand.  Professionalism affects the behavior and attitudes of the same legislators 
who control the strength of its characteristics through the policies they create.  In this 
two-part study, I measure the influence of personal and contextual factors on legislator 
attitudes towards the adequacy of legislative professionalism in state legislatures. I then 
identify the effects of legislative professionalism on legislator allocation of time.  I find 
that political (party) and personal (ambition) factors play the primary roles in shaping 
how legislators view the adequacy of professionalism in their legislatures. I also find that, 
while legislative professionalism does not significantly influence legislator attitudes 
towards professionalism, it does play an important role in determining the amount of time 
that legislators spend performing traditionally legislative activities, as well as the amount 
of time they would like to spend performing these activities. Overall, the legislators’ 
observed sense of contentment with current levels of professionalism in this study 
suggests that the amount of time currently allocated to their legislative activities will not 
be changing drastically in the near future. 
 
Keywords: Legislative Professionalism, State Legislatures, Legislator, Attitudes, 
Behavior, Ambition 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
 
INTRODUCTION AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Scholars of state politics generally view the increased professionalism of 
American state legislatures during the 1960s and 1970s as a significant institutional 
development (Malhotra 2008).  Legislator compensation, session length, and the number 
of legislative staff all increased.  This rise in professionalism occurred amidst concerns 
that amateur legislatures would be unable to meet the needs of their electorate (Miller 
1965; Heard 1966).  However, as legislatures became more professional, concern was 
expressed that professional legislators might be more likely to pursue their own 
professional interests than those of their constituents (Rosenthal 1989).  Professionalism, 
as a concept, has been hypothesized to influence behavior of political actors within and 
outside of legislatures (Squire 2007).  The degree of legislative professionalism can also 
shape the internal structure of a legislature, as well as its policy outputs.  While many 
studies look at the effects of legislative professionalism on political outcomes, the extent 
to which a legislature is professional is also a policy output.  Generally, legislators are 
able to help shape the degree to which the legislature is influenced. 
 Although a variety of specific measures have been used to measure legislative 
professionalism, they all reflect the same general concept.  Professionalism is a concept 
that measures a state legislature’s ability to “command the full attention of its members, 
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provide them with adequate resources to do their jobs in a manner comparable to that of 
other full-time political actors, and set up organizations and procedures that facilitate 
lawmaking” (Mooney 1995, 48-49).  Initially, professionalism was measured relative to 
what were defined as ideal characteristics of a professional legislature (Grumm 1971; 
Citizens Conference on State Legislatures 1971).  Later, Squire (1992a) developed a 
variation of that theme by comparing characteristics of state legislatures with those of an 
institution that was highly professional – the U.S. Congress.  Squire’s measure of 
professionalism, likely the most commonly used measure, compares a state’s legislator 
compensation, session length, and legislative staffing levels to those of Congress.  
Generally, different indexes of professionalism correlate highly with each other (Mooney 
1994, 1995).  Mooney (1985) found that pairwise correlations between indexes 
developed by Grumm (1971), Morehouse (1983), Bowman and Kearney (1988), and 
Squire (1992a) ranged from .77 to .87.  Despite occasional shifts in an individual state’s 
level of professionalism, the Squire Index calculated at one time correlates highly with 
previously calculated measures of professionalism (Squire 2007).   
 At one point, it looked like the movement to more professional state legislatures 
was inevitable.  In his research, King (2000) identified a trend of increasing 
professionalism in state legislatures that demonstrated no signs of stopping or reversing 
itself in the future.  However, contrary to King’s expectations, the pace of 
professionalism has slowed significantly (Squire and Hamm 2005; Kousser 2005; 
Matsusak 2004).  States have started the 21st Century facing significant budgetary and 
policy challenges, including political opposition to the expansion of legislator 
compensation and session length and the implementation of term limits for legislators.  
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The issue that now emerges is whether state legislatures are adequately professionalized 
to meet the challenges they face.  Do legislators have adequate resources to effectively 
meet the needs of their states?  Would legislators spend their time differently if their 
legislatures were more or less professional?  Professionalism’s dual role as an 
independent and dependent variable makes the impact of its institutional characteristics 
on legislator attitudes and behavior important to understand.  Professionalism affects the 
behavior and attitudes of the same legislators who control the strength of its 
characteristics through the policies they create.  In this study, I measure legislator 
attitudes towards the adequacy of legislative professionalism in state legislatures and the 
effects of legislative professionalism on legislator allocation of time.  First, I am 
interested in identifying what factors shape a legislator’s evaluation on the adequacy of 
professionalism found in their legislative body. In the second part, I examine the 
influence of legislative professionalism on the amount of time that state legislators spend 
on legislative activities and consider how variations in professionalism correlate with the 
amount of time that legislators would like to spend on different activities. 
 
Professionalism and State Legislatures 
Scholars often use professionalism as an independent variable to explain a 
number of political outcomes.  For example, professionalism plays a role in determining 
the composition of state legislatures.  The degree of legislative professionalism influences 
membership diversity (Squire 1992b), the presence of divided government and party 
composition (Fiorina 1994; Squire 1997; Stonecash and Agathangelou 1997), incumbent 
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reelection (Berry, Berkman, and Schneiderman 2000), and membership stability and 
turnover (Squire 1988; Moncrief, Niemi, and Powell 2004).   
 Legislative professionalism also shapes legislator behavior, legislative structure, 
policy outputs, and even the behavior of other political actors.  Levels of professionalism 
are connected to legislator relations with constituents (Squire 1993) and legislative 
efficiency (Squire 1998).  Professionalism also helps influence powers granted to 
legislative leadership (Richman 2010).  The degree of professionalism impacts the 
willingness to adopt increasingly complex and technical policies (Ka and Teske 2002) 
and the level of policy responsiveness (Maestas 2000).  Legislative professionalism 
influences the behavior of outside actors, as well, including interest groups (Berkman 
2001) and governors (Dilger, Krause, and Moffett 1995).  The relationship between 
professionalism and spending has also been explored with mixed results (Barrilleaux and 
Berkman 2003).  The work of Owings and Borck (2000) finds a positive relationship 
between professionalism and spending, but a more recent study by Malhotra (2008) calls 
that finding into question. 
 While legislative professionalism helps to explain a range of political outcomes, the 
degree to which a state legislature is professional is also a policy output.  State legislative 
professionalism should be viewed as a willful policy output and examined in terms of 
legislator views and motivations (Mooney 1995).  For example, Malhotra (2008) 
provides evidence that increased levels of spending lead to more professional legislatures.  
When the level of legislative professionalism is viewed as a policy output, it becomes 
important to understand whether legislators find increased professionalism desirable.  To 
achieve this end, I identify the variables that affect legislator attitudes toward 
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professionalism and attempt to uncover whether the degree of professionalism achieved 
by a legislature affects how its legislators are able to spend their time. 
 More specific research identifies some key differences in legislative behavior based 
on the type of the legislature they serve, and many studies observe the effects of 
professionalism on legislature-directed and constituency-directed legislator efforts, 
specifically. Thompson, Kurtz, and Moncrief (1996) found the increased pressures of 
casework and campaigning to be perceived most strongly by legislators from more 
professional institutions.  This finding is affirmed by Ellickson and Whistler (2001), who 
report that legislators in more professional legislatures spend more time on casework than 
legislators from citizen-type legislatures. Hogan (2012) presents the most recent relevant 
research, which argues that members of less professional legislatures spend more time on 
legislature-directed efforts, while members of more professional legislatures focus more 
of their time on constituent-related activities.  These studies assert that the degree of 
legislative professionalism shapes how individual members perform their job and provide 
support for our further inquiry.  Thompson and Moncrief (1992) argue that the degree of 
legislative professionalism influences the incentive structure and shapes how the 
individual legislator defines the job.  Because the level of professionalism plays a role in 
establishing a chamber’s incentive structure for service, the degree of professionalism 
will shape the membership of the legislature as well.  The degree of legislative 
professionalism is related to the degree to which legislators are interested in and able to 
maintain outside careers while in office (Maddox 2004). Professionalism’s relation to 
ambition is important to examine because findings show that legislator levels of ambition 
for higher office can influence representational activities (Maestas 2003; Hogan 2012). 
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For example, Herrick and Moore (1993) report that legislators holding such ambitions 
dedicate more time to floor activity, legislative specialization, and floor activities. 
 Although a litany of impressive research has been done in this area, there is an 
obvious gap in the existing research regarding how ambition, party identification, and 
other factors influence state legislators’ views of a need for greater professionalism in 
their legislatures.  This study is my attempt to contribute to this body of literature and 
hopefully fill that gap in the process.  I will proceed in the following manner.  First, I will 
provide a detailed description of the unique survey from which the data for this analysis 
were drawn.  In this chapter, I will explain the technique of survey administration, 
address potential threats to validity, and provide information on the demographic 
characteristics of the respondents.  I will then examine to what extent legislators are 
satisfied with current levels of legislative professionalism, and test variables that might 
shape individual legislator support for more professionalism.   This will include standard 
demographic variables, as well as variables such as population and gubernatorial power.  
That chapter will be followed by a statistical analysis of the influence of professionalism 
on individual behavior.  Specifically, I will test for the relationship between levels of 
professionalism and how members spend their time and how members would like to 
spend their time performing legislative activities.  I will conclude with a discussion of my 
findings, wherein I will also speculate about their broader meaning. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
 
SURVEY OF STATE LEGISLATORS 
 
Data for the present study were obtained from an internet-based survey of 
legislators in all 50 U.S. states.  The primary substantive focus of the survey was 
legislator attitudes toward legislative professionalism.  Additional questions addressed 
matters such as partisanship, ideology, length of legislative service, attitudes towards 
aspects of legislative behavior, as well as measures of personality. 
Legislators were contacted in September 2010 and asked to complete a self-
administered survey.  Respondents were assured that the survey was confidential, and no 
identifying information was obtained.  Telephone numbers and email addresses for two 
of the investigators were provided to respondents; in no instance did a legislator contact 
an investigator to express concerns regarding confidentiality.  Investigators followed up 
with state legislators on three subsequent occasions to encourage them to complete the 
survey.  Consistent with IRB policy, those contacted were given the option to opt out of 
future contact regarding the survey at any time.   
In all, 7,199 state legislators were contacted, of which 867 participated. This gives 
us a response rate of roughly 12%.  One hundred and eighty-six of the legislators we 
attempted to contact had published email addresses that were not functional.  One 
hundred and forty legislators opted out of receiving emails about the survey, and thus 
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declined to participate in the survey, at various points in the data collection process.  In 
addition, we were notified that two of the legislators we attempted to contact were 
deceased.   
Although some scholars would not consider a response rate of 12% to be ideal, I 
propose two reasons that support the position that, for our purposes, it provides a suitable 
sample to analyze.  First, the motivation for this study supports the idea that response rate 
is not a key issue.  According to Punch (2003), response rates are more important when a 
researcher is attempting to make generalizations about a larger population and less 
important if the primary purpose of the researcher is to gain insight.  Therefore, if my 
purpose were to make sweeping assessments regarding the general attitudes of the 
American public, my response rate could be potentially hazardous.  However, because I 
am simply trying to gain insight on the attitudes of state legislators, my response rate is 
not a hindrance.   
Secondly, existing research supports the notion that because I am examining such 
a narrow swath of people, a lower response rate is acceptable.  In an examination of 
response tendencies of general practitioners, Templeton et al (1997) found that, on 
average, attempts to survey these individuals produced relatively low response rates.  
However, they argued that because this was such a specific group of people, a low 
response rate did not necessarily exert a negative influence on the validity of the data 
collected.  Given that one could reasonably assume that state legislators are at the very 
least as select a group as general practitioners, I argue that Templeton et al’s (1997) is 
applicable.  The important point to take away is that there is sufficient evidence to 
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support the idea that the data used for this examination, and the subsequent conclusions 
drawn from this examination, are valid. 
I will now explore some of the demographic characteristics of the respondents.  
Eighty-one percent of respondents are house members, while 19% are state senators. The 
modal category for tenure is three to six years, although 25% of the sample has served 
longer than 10 years.  Politically speaking, our sample is slightly Democratic, as 54% of 
respondents self-identify as Democrats while 46% self-identify as Republicans.  
Ideologically speaking, roughly 48% of respondents self-identify as being at least slightly 
conservative, around 30% self-identify as at least slightly liberal, and roughly 22% self-
identify as ideologically moderate.  The respondents’ economic and social stances largely 
support these responses. A majority of respondents consider themselves overwhelmingly 
conservative on economic issues and slightly conservative on social issues. More than 
half of respondents think that the quality of their fellow legislators is high and the 
performance of their respective state legislatures is good. The sample identified K-12 
education as the most important issue facing their state, followed closely by taxes. 
From a socio-demographic perspective, with regard to gender, 68% of our 
respondents were male and 32% were female.  In terms of racial makeup, 91% self-
identified as white, 4% self-identified as African-American, 2% self-identified as 
Hispanic, and 3% self-identified as “other”.  Finally, all 50 states were represented in the 
survey, with New Hampshire having the largest contingent of respondents at 99.1 
                                                 
1
 New Hampshire having the largest response rate is not surprising, as the New Hampshire state house is 
the largest state legislative body in the country. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
 
LEGISLATOR ATTITUDES TOWARDS THE ADEQUACY OF LEGISLATIVE 
PROFESSIONALISM 
 
In the first part of this study, I hypothesize that seven variables are likely to 
influence a legislator’s view on the desirability of a more professional legislature.  The 
seven variables include party, ambition for higher office, length of tenure, 
professionalism of the legislature, gubernatorial power, state population, and gender.  
Given the context of political discourse from the past decade, the expectation is that 
Republican lawmakers will be more content with current levels of professionalism than 
Democratic lawmakers. I anticipate that Republicans will not favor further 
professionalism because of the greater resources and government expansion it would 
entail.  I expect that those candidates who harbor future electoral ambitions will favor 
increased professionalism because it earns them greater institutional resources, which 
provide them with the flexibility to spend more time on activities that will further their 
respective careers, such as fundraising, giving speeches, and participating in other 
activities. These activities help to increase their name recognition. 
I expect that legislators that have served longer tenures will favor increased 
professionalism.  Because these legislators have settled into positions at the state 
legislative level, it is likely that these legislators would like these additional resources
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to help them be more productive in their current jobs.  As gubernatorial power increases, 
I anticipate legislators will desire greater levels of professionalism.  I expect this will be 
the case because legislators will want the additional resources that increased 
professionalism brings so that they can lessen the power gap that exists between the 
legislative and executive branches.   
More populous states are hypothesized to have more heterogeneous populations, 
and, as a result, have more complex political issues that merit greater attention by the 
legislature.  Consequently, legislators from larger states are expected to feel that current 
levels of professionalism are not adequate to meet the challenges that they face.  Because 
more professional legislatures have greater capacity to fulfill their role in the policy-
making process (Mooney 1994), legislators from more professional legislatures are more 
likely to consider their present levels of professionalism to be adequate.  Finally, I 
included gender as a control variable in the model.  Women are more likely than men to 
report that their legislative jobs are full-time (Kurtz, et al. 2006), and full-time jobs 
require more resources in order to be more productive. Thus, my expectation is that 
women will be more likely to express dissatisfaction with current levels of legislative 
professionalism than men. 
 
Methods 
This part of the study utilizes four dependent variables and seven independent 
variables.  The four dependent variables are all dichotomous.  The first dependent 
variable measures whether respondents thought their state legislature currently had an 
adequate level of professionalism.  This variable was coded 0 if respondents thought their 
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legislature was adequately professional and 1 if respondents thought their legislature was 
not adequately professional.  The second dependent variable measures whether legislators 
felt they received adequate compensation for the work they do.  This variable is coded 0 
if respondents believed they were compensated adequately for their work and 1 if 
respondents believed their level of compensation they received for their work was 
inadequate.  The third dependent variable measures whether legislators were satisfied 
with the length of their legislative session.  This variable was coded 0 if respondents 
thought the length of their legislative session was adequate and 1 if respondents thought 
the length of their legislative session was inadequate.  The final dependent variable 
measures whether legislators felt their legislature was adequately staffed.  This variable is 
coded 0 if respondents believed legislative staffing was adequate and 1 if respondents 
believed legislative staffing was inadequate.   
There are seven independent variables observed in this analysis.  The first 
measures the current level of professionalism in each state legislature.  This measure is 
taken from Squire’s (2007) work on state legislatures.   This variable ranges from a low 
of .033 to a high of .675, and has a mean of .166.  The second independent variable 
measures gubernatorial power in the state.  This variable, which was taken from the work 
of Beyle (2007), ranges from a low of 2.6 to a high of 4.3, with a mean of 3.48.  The next 
independent variable measures the population of the state.  These figures were obtained 
from U.S. Census data.  The fourth independent variable is a dichotomous measure of 
gender, coded 0 if the respondent was male a 1 if the respondent was female. 
Party identification is a dichotomous variable, coded 0 if the respondent is a 
Democrat and 1 if the respondent is a Republican.  The tenure variable measures how 
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long the respondent has been in office.  It is coded 0 if the legislator has served two years 
or fewer, 1 if the respondent has served between three and six years, 2 if the respondent 
has served between seven and ten years, and 3 if the respondent has been in office longer 
than ten years.  The final independent variable measures the respondent’s level of 
political ambition.  This variable is coded 0 if the respondent has no interest in running 
for higher office, 1 if the respondent would not rule out pursuing higher office but is not 
currently interested, 2 if the respondent might run for higher office, and 3 if the 
respondent is definitely interested in running for higher office. 
 
Results 
The models presented in Table 3.1 illustrate the determinants of legislator opinion 
on the various aspects of legislative professionalism, as well as whether respondents 
thought their legislature would benefit from increased professionalism.  Because the 
dependent variables are dichotomous, logit models were estimated in each case.   
 (Insert Table 3.1 here) 
The first column in Table 3.1 illustrates the effect of the independent variables on 
legislator views regarding the potential benefits of increased professionalism on the 
legislature.  The significant negative coefficient operating on party identification 
indicates that, when the other variables are held constant, Republicans are more likely 
than Democrats to think that their legislature is adequately professional.  The significant 
negative coefficient operating on the ambition variable indicates that, when the other 
variables are held constant, respondents who have a higher level of political ambition are 
more likely to think their legislatures would benefit from increased professionalism.  
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Gender is positive and statistically significant, which indicates that female legislators are 
more likely to think their legislature would benefit from increased professionalism.  The 
coefficients for population, gubernatorial power, legislative professionalism, and length 
of tenure failed to reach statistical significance. 
The second column in Table 3.1 illustrates the effect of the independent variables 
on legislator views regarding the length of the legislative session.  The significant 
negative coefficient operating on party identification indicates that, when the other 
variables are held constant, Republicans are more likely than Democrats to think that the 
length of the legislative session is adequate.  The significant negative coefficient 
operating on the length of tenure variable indicates that, when the other variables are held 
constant, respondents who have served in the legislature for a longer period of time are 
more likely to think the length of the legislative session is adequate.  The political 
ambition variable is positive and significant, which indicates that more ambitious 
legislators are more likely to think the length of the legislative session is inadequate.  
Gubernatorial power is also positive and significant, which indicates that legislators in 
states with stronger governors are more likely to believe the length of the session is 
inadequate.  The coefficients for population, legislative professionalism, and gender 
failed to reach statistical significance. 
The third column in Table 3.1 illustrates the effect of the independent variables on 
legislator views regarding staffing.  The significant negative coefficient operating on 
party identification indicates that, when the other variables are held constant, Republicans 
are more likely than Democrats to think that their legislature is adequately staffed.  The 
significant negative coefficient operating on the professionalism variable indicates that, 
 15 
when the other variables are held constant, respondents who serve in more professional 
legislatures are more likely to think their legislature’s level of staffing is adequate.  
Gender is positive and statistically significant, which indicates that female legislators are 
more likely to think their legislature’s level of staffing is inadequate.  The length of 
tenure variable is also positive and significant, which indicates that legislators who have 
served for longer periods of time are less likely to feel their legislatures are adequately 
staffed.  The coefficients for population, gubernatorial power, and ambition failed to 
reach statistical significance. 
The final column in Table 3.1 illustrates the effect of the independent variables on 
legislator views regarding compensation.  The significant negative coefficient operating 
on party identification indicates that, when the other variables are held constant, 
Republicans are more likely to think they are adequately compensated than Democrats.  
In addition, the significant negative coefficient operating on the professionalism variable 
indicates that, when the other variables are held constant, respondents who serve in more 
professional legislatures are more likely to think the compensation they receive is 
adequate.  Gender is positive and statistically significant, which indicates that women are 
more likely than men to think their level of compensation is inadequate.  The political 
ambition variable is also positive and significant, which indicates that more ambitious 
legislators are less likely to feel they are adequately compensated for their work.  The 
coefficients for population, gubernatorial power, and length of tenure failed to reach 
statistical significance. 
Logit coefficients are informative in regard to the direction of, and the statistical 
significance of, the effect of independent variables.  However, they cannot be directly 
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interpreted in the same way that regression coefficients can and they provide little 
information regarding substantive impact.  Therefore, predicted probabilities were 
calculated in order to highlight the effect of party identification, gender, length of tenure, 
ambition, current level of professionalism, and gubernatorial power on support for the 
various aspects of legislative professionalism. 
(Insert Table 3.2 here) 
The first column in Table 3.2 indicates that party identification, gender, and 
ambition exert a significant influence on opinion regarding whether a legislator believes 
his/her legislature would benefit from more professionalism.  When all variables are set 
at the mean, 38 percent of Democrats believe their legislature would benefit from 
increased professionalism, as opposed to only 30 percent of Republicans who feel the 
same way.  Forty-three percent of female legislators support increased professionalism, 
while increased professionalism is only supported by 31 percent of male legislators.  
Forty-seven percent of those with a high level of ambition are likely to support increased 
professionalism, while that number drops to 25% among those with a low level of 
ambition. 
The second column in Table 3.2 indicates that party identification, ambition, 
tenure, and gubernatorial power exert a significant influence on opinion regarding 
whether a legislator believes his/her legislature would benefit from longer sessions.  
When all variables are set at the mean, 37 percent of Democrats believe their legislature 
would benefit from longer sessions, while only 19 percent of Republicans who feel the 
same way.  Thirty-three percent of those who fall into the shortest tenure category 
support longer sessions, as opposed to 22% of those in the longest tenure category.  
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Thirty-seven percent of those with a high level of ambition are likely to support longer 
sessions, while only 22% of those with a low level of ambition would support longer 
sessions.  Finally, 40% of legislators in states with the highest level of gubernatorial 
power would support longer sessions, while only 19% of legislators support longer 
sessions in states with the lowest level of gubernatorial power. 
The third column in Table 3.2 indicates that party identification, tenure, and level 
of professionalism exert a significant influence on opinion regarding whether a legislator 
believes his/her legislature would benefit from more legislative staff.  When all variables 
are set at the mean, 42 percent of Democrats believe their legislature would benefit from 
additional staff, while only 21 percent of Republicans believe increased staffing would be 
beneficial.  Thirty-six percent of those who fall into the shortest tenure category support 
increased staffing, as opposed to 28% of those in the longest tenure category.  Finally, 
44% of legislators in states with a low level of legislative professionalism would support 
increased staffing, while only 5% of legislators in states with a high level of legislative 
professionalism believe an increase in staff would be beneficial. 
The final column in Table 3.2 indicates that party identification, gender, ambition, 
and level of professionalism exert a significant influence on opinion regarding whether a 
legislator believes his/her legislature would benefit from an increase in compensation.  
When all variables are set at the mean, 66 percent of Democrats believe their legislature 
would benefit from additional compensation, while only 43 percent of Republicans 
believe a compensation increase would be beneficial.  Fifty-four percent of female 
legislators support a compensation increase, while 46 percent of male legislators would 
support such an increase.   Sixty-three percent of those with a high level of ambition are 
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likely to support longer sessions, while 50% of those with a low level of ambition would 
support longer sessions.  The biggest discrepancy across all categories emerges with 
regard to legislative professionalism, as 66% of legislators in states with a low level of 
legislative professionalism would support an increase in compensation, while only 5% of 
legislators in states with a high level of legislative professionalism would support an 
increase in compensation. 
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Attitude toward Professionalism by Legislative Characteristics 
 
                     Adeq. Professionalized          Session                  Staff            Compensation 
 
Constant                        -.956                           -3.135*                 -.269                  1.831**                             
                                      (.695)                           (.755)                  (.707)                  (.674)               
  
Professionalization        -.137                             1.71                   -4.234**            -3.363**                               
                                       (1.18)                          (1.20)                 (1.306)               (1.174)               
 
Population                -.002                             -.001                   -.002                  .001                                 
                                       (.002)                           (.001)                  (.002)                (.002)               
 
Gubernatorial Power      -.001                             .651**                .093                  -.266                                 
                                       (.212)                           (.228)                 (.217)                 (.204)             
 
Party Identification   -.351**                        -.901**                -.992**            -.923**                                 
                                      (.170)                          (.185)                   (.179)               (.165) 
 
Gender     .506**                          .124                     .317**              .271*                              
                                      (.178)                          (.189)                   (.181)                (.178)                         
 
Ambition        .320**                         .245**                  .102                   .176**                                 
                                      (.093)                          (.097)                   (.095)                 (.090) 
  
Tenure           -.005                           -.187**                  .126*                 -.092                                 
                                      (.076)                          (.081)                   (.078)                  (.074)                                        
 
 
                                         N=686                N=701                     N=698     N=698                      
                LR Chi2=27,8                 LR Chi2=64.1           LR Chi2=63.7     LR Chi2=60.3       
                P>Chi2=.00                     P>Chi2=.00               P>Chi2=.00        P>Chi2=.00                           
                Psuedo  R2=.03               Psuedo  R2=.08         Psuedo  R2=.07  Psuedo  R2=.06       
 
*p<.10 
**p<.05 
Standard errors in parentheses 
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Table 3.1:  Attitude toward Professionalism by Legislative Characteristics. This table 
presents the logit coefficients of the seven independent variables predicted to influence 
legislator attitudes toward professionalism. These coefficients demonstrate the direction 
and statistical significance of each variable’s influence. 
 
 
Predicted Probabilities of Support for Various Aspects of Legislative 
Professionalism 
 
                                    More                         Longer              More                Greater 
  Professionalization             Session             Staff             Compensation 
 
Republican                   30%    19%  21%    43%     
Democrat        38%    37%  42%    66% 
 
 
Male                          31%    ---   ---    54% 
Female                         43%    ---   ---    61% 
 
 
Short Tenure              ---   33%  28%     --- 
Long Tenure              ---   22%  36%     --- 
 
 
High Ambition      47%   37%   ---    63% 
Low Ambition       25%   22%   ---    50% 
 
 
Gub Power High          ---   40%   ---     --- 
Gub Power Low           ---   19%   ---     --- 
 
 
High Professionalized  ---    ---   5%    18% 
Low Professionalized   ---    ---  44%    66% 
 
 
 
Table 3.2:  Predicted Probabilities of Support for Various Aspects of Legislative 
Professionalism. This table presents the predicted probabilities that indicate the 
substantive impact of political ideology, gender, length of tenure, political ambition, 
gubernatorial power, and level of professionalism on legislator attitudes toward 
professionalism. 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
 
EFFECTS OF LEGISLATIVE PROFESSIONALISM ON LEGISLATOR 
ALLOCATION OF TIME 
 
In the second segment of my research, I posit three main hypotheses about the 
effects of legislative professionalism on legislator allocation of time. The central one 
states that members of more professional legislatures are more likely to spend time 
performing traditionally legislative activities and are also more likely to prefer spending 
more time performing those activities.  In many ways, this hypothesis can be seen as an 
extension of the argument made by Thompson and Moncrief (1992).  The expectation is 
that the responsibilities associated with serving in a more professional legislature will 
mean that members from those legislatures will have to spend greater amounts of time 
performing many legislative activities.  Because spending greater time performing 
legislative activities establishes an incentive structure that some legislators will find more 
attractive than others, the general expectation is that members of more professional 
legislatures will be more interested in spending a greater amount of time performing 
those activities.  In summary, members of more professional legislatures will not only 
spend more time performing many of their legislative activities, but they will also want to 
be spending time doing them.
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While the primary attention of this research centers on the relationship between 
legislative professionalism and member activity, there are two other hypotheses of 
significant interest in the second portion of my study.  Ambition theory predicts that 
legislators shape their behavior and work to achieve their long-term objectives 
(Schlesinger 1966, Hibbing 1993, Herrick 2001). Members with an ambition to seek 
higher office are more likely to spend time, and would ideally like to spend time, on 
activities that will help fulfill their ambitions.  My third hypothesis centers on the impact 
of tenure on member allocation of time.  As a member’s tenure increases, so does his or 
her incentive structure.  Members with lengthy tenures have accrued many of the 
advantages associated with incumbency, including significant advantages in name 
recognition.  The expectation is that members with longer tenure are more likely to spend 
time on activities they like to do rather than the ones traditionally required to get elected. 
Methods 
There are eleven pairs of dependent variables utilized in this analysis.  The 
dependent variables measure both the amount of time and the ideal amount of time that 
legislators spend engaging in the following common legislative activities:  meeting with 
citizens in their home district, meeting with constituents at the capital, fundraising, 
participating in committee meetings, meeting at the capital on issues, studying legislation, 
working on informal causes, participating in floor debates, working to build coalitions, 
engaging in agency oversight, and giving speeches outside of their district.  The questions 
posed regarding the activities were “How much time do you spend engaging in _____”, 
and “Ideally, how much time would you like to spend engaging in _____”.  Responses 
were coded 0 to 3 in both instances, with 0 representing a great deal, 1 representing a 
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moderate amount, 2 representing a little, and 3 representing almost none.  An ordered 
logit was used to conduct the analysis. 
There are eight independent variables used in this analysis.  The first measures the 
current level of professionalism in each state legislature.  This measure is taken from 
Squire’s (2007) work on state legislatures.   This variable ranges from a low of .033 to a 
high of .675 and has a mean of .166.  The second independent variable measures 
gubernatorial power in the state.  This variable, which was taken from the work of Beyle 
(2007), ranges from a low of 2.6 to a high of 4.3, with a mean of 3.48.  The next 
independent variable measures the population log of the state.  This was calculated from 
U.S. Census data and accounts for a decline in exponential population growth as a state’s 
population settles and matures.  The fourth independent variable is a dichotomous 
measure of gender, coded 0 if the respondent was male and 1 if the respondent was 
female.  The fifth independent variable is a dichotomous measure of state legislative 
leadership, coded 0 if the respondent held no type of leadership position in the legislature 
and 1 if he or she did. 
Party identification is a dichotomous variable, coded 0 if the respondent is a 
Democrat and 1 if the respondent is a Republican.  The tenure variable measures how 
long the respondent has been in office.  It is coded 0 if the legislator has served two years 
or fewer, 1 if the respondent has served between three and six years, 2 if the respondent 
has served between seven and ten years, and 3 if the respondent has been in office longer 
than ten years.  The final independent variable measures the respondent’s level of 
political ambition.  This variable is coded 0 if the respondent has no interest in running 
for higher office, 1 if the respondent would not rule out pursuing higher office but are not 
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currently interested, 2 if the respondent might run for higher office, and 3 if the 
respondent is definitely interested in running for higher office. 
Results 
 Table 4.1 provides insight into how legislators actually spend their time. 
(Insert Table 4.1 here) 
 In this table, the three primary independent variables of interest behave as 
hypothesized.  First, legislators who serve in more professional state legislatures spend 
significantly more time meeting with citizens in their districts, fundraising, meeting in the 
capital on issues, and participating in floor debate than those with in legislatures with 
lowers levels of professionalism.  They spend significantly less time working to build 
coalitions than members who serve in less professional legislatures.  No significant 
difference exists with regard to time spent on any of the other legislative activities 
between those who serve in more professional and less professional state legislatures. 
 Legislators who have longer tenure spend their time much differently than those 
who have not been in office as long.  Legislators who have accumulated a lengthier 
tenure spend significantly less time meeting with citizens in their districts, fundraising, 
and studying legislation.  These legislators are more likely to spend their time meeting at 
the capital on issues, participating in floor debates, building coalitions, engaging in 
agency oversight, and giving speeches outside of their district.  There is no significant 
difference with regard to time spent on any of the other legislative activities among those 
with longer and shorter legislative tenures. 
 Legislators who have ambition to seek higher office in the future spend 
significantly more time meeting with citizens in their districts, engaging in agency 
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oversight, and giving speeches outside of their district than those who are not motivated 
to seek higher political office in the future.  There is no significant difference with regard 
to time spent on any of the other legislative activities among those with varying levels of 
political ambition. 
 Additionally, I find that serving in a leadership capacity puts extra demands on 
legislators, as leaders are more likely to meet with constituents at the capital, engage in 
fundraising activities, meet at the capital on issues, gives speeches outside of the district, 
and engage in coalition building.  Female state legislators are more likely to participate in 
committee meetings, meet at the capital on issues, and spend time studying legislation 
than male state legislators.  Also, the only difference that emerges between Republican 
and Democratic state legislators with regard to how they spend their time is that 
Democrats show a greater propensity to meet with constituents at the capital than 
Republicans. 
 Table 4.2 provides insight into how legislators prefer to spend their time. 
(Insert Table 4.2 here) 
 Again, the three primary independent variables of interest behave as hypothesized.  
Legislators who serve in more professional state legislatures would like to spend 
significantly more time meeting with citizens in their districts, meeting with constituents 
in the capital, fundraising, meeting in the capital on issues, participating in floor debate, 
and engaging in agency oversight than those with in legislatures with lowers levels of 
professionalism.  No significant difference exists with regard to how much time they 
would like to spend on any of the other legislative activities between those who serve in 
more professional and less professional state legislatures. 
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 Legislators who have accumulated a lengthier tenure would ideally spend 
significantly less time meeting with citizens in their districts.  These legislators would 
like to spend more time in committee meetings, participating in floor debates, and giving 
speeches outside of their district.  There is no significant difference with regard to how 
much time they would like to spend on any of the other legislative activities among those 
with longer and shorter legislative tenures. 
 Legislators who have ambition to seek higher office in the future would like to 
spend significantly more time meeting with citizens in their districts, meeting with 
constituents at the capital, fundraising, studying legislation, engaging in agency 
oversight, and giving speeches outside of their district than those who are not motivated 
to seek higher political office in the future.  There is no significant difference with regard 
to ideal amount of time spent on any of the other legislative activities among those with 
varying levels of political ambition.  In addition to the hypothesized variables of interest, 
I found that state legislators serving in a leadership capacity would like to spend more 
time engaging in fundraising activities than rank and file members.  Republican state 
legislators indicate a preference to spend less time in committees, studying legislation, 
meeting in the capital on issues, working on informal causes, and engaging in coalition 
building.  Female state legislators would like to spend more time in committees, studying 
legislation, meeting in the capital on issues, and working on informal causes, and less 
time giving speeches outside of their legislative district.
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Amount of Time Spent on Legislative Activities by Legislator Characteristics 
 
   Meet Citizen in Dist.  Meet Cons. at Capital           Fundraising Committee       Cap. Issues            Study Leg.  
Leader                .102  -1.044**  -1.595**      .152          -1.119**               -.367 
                                                       (.434)  (.434)   (.411)       (.483)         (.496)  (.484) 
                                                         
Professionalism                            -2.165**  -.818   -1.762*       -1.532         -2.768**                     -.263 
                                                     (1.037)  (.979)   (.957)       (1.066)         (1.013)              (1.080) 
 
Gub Power                                     -.214  -.350**   -.111       .470**         .401**   -.158 
                                                       (.188)  (.181)   (.178)       (.201)         (.187)   (.200) 
 
Party ID                                         -.246*  -.243*   .216       .136          .150    -.079 
                                                       (.153)  (.147)   (.146)       (.159)         (.151)    (.163) 
 
Tenure                                            .119*  -.052   .215**       -.014          -.174**     .155** 
            (.069)  (.068)   (.068)       (.073)         (.070)    (.074) 
 
Ambition                                        .219**  .017   .095       .067          .040      .036 
                                                       (.084)  (.081)   (.080)       (.087)         (.083)     (.088) 
 
Gender                              .169  .133   -.170       -.599**         -.406**    -.618** 
                         (.161)  (.157)   .158       (.178)         (.165)     (.181) 
 
Pop Log                           -.326**  -.348**   -.412**       .114          .129    -.207** 
                                                     (-.099)  (.096)   (.095)       (.104)         (.098)     (.105) 
    
                                                    N = 700  N = 699               N = 694     N = 694      N = 701      N = 698 
                                                         LR Chi2 = 61.5 LR Chi2 = 50.1             LR Chi2 = 82.1    LR Chi2 = 20.2        LR Chi2 = 29.2        LR Chi2 = 25.1 
                                                         P>Chi2 = 0.000              P>Chi2 = 0.000             P>Chi2 = 0.000             P>Chi2 = .0095        P>Chi2 = .0003        P>Chi2=.0015 
                                                         Pseudo R2 = .044 Pseudo R2 = .030             Pseudo R2 = .048         Pseudo R2 = .018     Pseudo R2 = .021      Pseudo R2=.024 
 
*p<.10 
**p<.05 
Standard errors in parentheses 
 
Table 4.1.  Amount of Time Spent on Legislative Activities by Legislator Characteristics. This table presents the logit 
coefficients of the eight independent variables predicted to influence the eleven dependent legislator behaviors. These 
coefficients demonstrate the direction and statistical significance of each variable’s influence. 
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Table 4.1 Cont.  Amount of Time Spent on Legislative Activities by Legislator Characteristics 
 
   Informal Cause  Floor Debate  Coalition      Oversight          Speech out of District 
Leader   -.391   -.552   -1.765**         -.338  -1.091** 
   (.426)   (.489)   (.437)          (.414)  (.429) 
 
Professionalism  .494   -1.812*   2.732**          -.679  -.975 
   (.944)   (1.038)   (.926)          (.933)  (.934) 
 
Gub Power  .123   .390**   .290*          .156  -.066 
   (.175)   (.194)   (.176)          (.176)  (.178) 
 
Party ID   .024   -.075   .127          -.111  -.231 
   (.144)   (.155)   (.146)          (.144)  (.146) 
 
Tenure   .026   -.244**   -.111*          -.231**  -.254** 
   (.066)   (.072)   (.067)          (.067)  (.068) 
 
Ambition  .038   -.010   .112          .137*  .419** 
   (.079)   (.086)   (.081)          (.079)  (.083) 
 
Gender   -.270*   -.214   -.168          .035  .097 
   (.156)   (.168)   (.155)          (.155)  (.155) 
 
Pop Log   -.143   .124   -.372**          .073  -.285** 
   (.092)   (.102)   (.095)          (.093)  (.094) 
 
 
   N = 699   N = 696            N = 692       N = 695  N = 696 
   LR Chi2 = 7.3  LR Chi2 = 20.3           LR Chi2 = 43.3      LR Chi2 = 16.9 LR Chi2 = 84.4 
   P>Chi2 = .5001                P>Chi2 = .0092             P>Chi2 = 0.000      P>Chi2 = .0308 P>Chi2 = 0.000 
   Pseudo R2 = .004  Pseudo R2 = .015          Pseudo R2 = .025      Pseudo R2 = .010 Pseudo R2 = .049 
 
 
*p<.10 
**p<.05 
Standard errors in parentheses 
 
Table 4.1 Cont.  Amount of Time Spent on Legislative Activities by Legislator Characteristics 
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Ideal Amount of Time Spent on Legislative Activities by Legislator Characteristics 
 
   Meet Citizen in Dist. Meet Cons. at Capital Fundraising   Committee          Cap. Issues            Study Leg. 
Leader   -.110   -.577   -.692*       .729*             -.220  .287 
   (.473)   (.412)   (.413)       (.441)            (.461)  (.463) 
 
Professionalism  -3.120**  -1.737*   -1.775*       -1.000            -2.055**  -1.312 
   (1.125)   (1.007)   (.929)       (1.021)            (1.013)  (1.072) 
 
Gub Power  -.229   -.346*   -.010       .401**            .344*  -.150 
   (.195)   (.181)   (.179)       (.195)            (.191)  (.198) 
 
Party ID   .250   .038   -.068       .398**            .378**  .289* 
   (.160)   (.149)   (.145)       (.154)            (.154)  (.161) 
 
Tenure   .176**   -.012   .108       -.130*            -.059  -.001 
   (.073)   (.069)   (.068)       (.071)            (.071)  (.074) 
 
Ambition  .331**   .206**   .221**       .039             .119  .145* 
   (.089)   (.082)   (.081)       (.084)            (.084)  (.089) 
 
Gender   .073   .090   .213       -.403**            -.603**  -.513** 
   (.170)   (.159)   (.157)       .167             (.166)  (.178) 
 
Pop Log   -.211**   -.129   -.169*       .181*             .081  .067 
   (.103)   (.095)   (.092)       (.100)            (.101)  (.103) 
 
 
   N = 701                  N = 699               N = 698     N = 697      N = 700       N = 699 
                                                LR Chi2 = 70.4                 LR Chi2 = 35.9             LR Chi2 = 38.5    LR Chi2 = 25.8        LR Chi2 = 30.8        LR Chi2 = 21.3 
                                                P>Chi2 = 0.000                      P>Chi2 = 0.000             P>Chi2 = 0.000             P>Chi2 = .0011        P>Chi2 = .0002        P>Chi2=.0065 
                                                Pseudo R2 = .060                 Pseudo R2 = .023             Pseudo R2 = .024         Pseudo R2 = .021     Pseudo R2 = .024      Pseudo R2=.020 
 
 
*p<.10 
**p<.05 
Standard errors in parentheses 
 
Table 4.2.  Ideal Amount of Time Spent on Legislative Activities by Legislator Characteristics. This table presents the 
predicted probabilities that indicate the substantive impact of the eight independent variables on legislator behaviors. 
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Table 4.2 Cont. Ideal Amount of Time Spent on Legislative Activities by Legislator Characteristics 
 
        Informal Cause         Floor Debate            Coalition                          Oversight               Speech out of District 
Leader   -.507   -.120   -.282   -.171   -.314 
   (.425)   (.445)   (.431)   (.431)   (.390) 
 
Professionalism  .197   -2.445**  -.176   -1.935**  -1.394 
   (.959)   (1.015)   (.967)   (.968)   (.933) 
 
Gub Power  .001   .377**   .066   .090   .009 
   (.182)   (.187)   (.182)   (.180)   (.175) 
 
Party ID   .300**   .041   .408**   -.092   -.105 
   (.149)   (.150)   (.149)   (.147)   (.145) 
 
Tenure   .036   -.181**   .061   -.092   -.164** 
   (.068)   (.069)   (.067)   (.068)   (.067) 
 
Ambition  .103   .089   .107   .278**   .466** 
   (.081)   (.082)   (.082)   (.082)   (.083) 
 
Gender   -.350**   -.158   -.294*   -.005   .155** 
   (.159)   (.162)   (.158)   (.158)   (.155) 
 
Pop Log   -.023   .260**   -.252**   .055   .018 
   (.095)   (.098)   (.097)   (.095)   (.091) 
 
 
   N = 695   N = 696   N = 698   N = 698   N = 691 
   LR Chi2 = 14.4  LR Chi2 = 17.0  LR Chi2 = 29.9  LR Chi2 = 19.4  LR Chi2 = 58.6 
   Prob>Chi2 = .0715                  Prob>Chi2 = .0300                Prob>Chi2 = .0002                 Prob>Chi2 = .0128                Prob>Chi2 = 0.000 
   Pseudo R2 = .009                  Pseudo R2 = .013                  Pseudo R2 = .019                 Pseudo R2 = .013                Pseudo R2 = .033 
 
 
*p<.10 
**p<.05 
Standard errors in parentheses 
 
Table 4.2.  Ideal Amount of Time Spent on Legislative Activities by Legislator Characteristics. This table presents the 
predicted probabilities that indicate the substantive impact of the eight independent variables on legislator behaviors. 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
 
CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS 
 
The results from the previous two chapters help fill a gap in research by providing 
a sense of how legislators feel about the degree of professionalism in their legislature and 
expand on existing research regarding professionalism’s effect on legislator allocation of 
time.  This information is particularly relevant since legislators are typically among those 
that have the ability to change the institutional characteristics of a legislative body.  
While most legislatures fall far short of the U.S. Congress in terms of professionalism, 
there is not an overwhelming sense that legislatures lack the institutional capacity to 
fulfill their policy-making responsibilities and address the many challenges they face.  
The legislators’ observed sense of contentment with current levels of professionalism 
suggests that the amount of time currently allocated to their legislative activities will not 
be changing drastically in the near future. The major conclusions from each substantive 
chapter of this paper are presented below. They will be followed by a brief discussion of 
their implications on legislative professionalism and possible future directions for this 
line of research. 
Legislator Attitudes Toward the Adequacy of Legislative Professionalism 
The clear lesson from the first half of our research is that political (party) and 
personal (ambition) factors play the primary roles in shaping how legislators view the 
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adequacy of professionalism in their legislatures.  These factors trump institutional 
characteristics such as gubernatorial power and legislative professionalism.  In this 
regard, our findings support those of Hogan (2012). In particular, party identification 
exerts a significant influence on all aspects of legislative professionalism, as there is a 
significant difference between Republicans and Democrats with regard to their views on 
staffing, compensation, session length, and whether their legislature would benefit from 
increased professionalism.  This is consistent with our expectations and suggests the 
presence of a philosophical divide over the scope of legislative professionalism.  The 
divide between how Republicans and Democrats view the need for legislative 
professionalism likely played a greater role in the plateauing of the professionalism 
revolution than did any consensus that legislatures had become adequately professional.  
The consistent performance of the ambition variable provides evidence that 
legislators who expressed the greatest interest in advancing their political careers also had 
an interest in creating a legislature that would best help them meet those goals.  Increased 
session length and compensation would help facilitate their goals of pursuing careers in 
politics.  Institutional factors seem to be secondary to personal and political factors in 
shaping how legislators view legislative professionalism.  Increased session length was 
the only dependent variable for which gubernatorial strength was significant.  This 
suggests that legislators see the part-time nature of the legislature relative to the full-time 
executive as the greatest disadvantage they face when competing with the executive 
branch.  Also interesting is that population does not have an effect on legislative 
professionalism.  One would expect that legislatures in states with a larger population 
would be more professional in order to better handle the more diverse set of demands 
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present by the residents of that state.  Surprisingly, we find that to not necessarily be the 
case. 
Another interesting finding from this analysis is the fact that legislators are largely 
satisfied with the level of professionalism in their legislature.  Aside from being 
dissatisfied with the level of financial compensation they receive, legislators generally 
expressed satisfaction with regard to the other aspects of institutional professionalism.  
This runs contrary to conventional wisdom, as one would expect a higher level of 
dissatisfaction given that, in many instances, it is necessary for legislators to put in half-
time, or even full-time, work with only a part-time legislative support system in place. 
While it is important not to overreach, the results here do suggest that, at least in 
the near future, the degree of professionalism is going to be shaped by partisan 
perspective and philosophical difference on the nature of professionalism rather than the 
need to become professional or not.  This study also suggests that there is more we can 
learn from legislators and the impact of legislative professionalism.  It would be 
particularly interesting to learn more about to what extent legislators from more 
professional legislatures spend their time and priority policy relative to members of less 
professional chambers. 
The Impact of Legislative Professionalism on Legislator Allocation of Time 
The question that arose at the end of the conclusion above led to the second half 
of this study. How legislators spend their time, and how they would ideally like to spend 
their time, is one of the most important topics of discussion for observers of 
contemporary legislative politics.  Our research attempts to shed light on this subject.  We 
argued that legislative professionalism, length of tenure, and ambition to seek higher 
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office exert a significant influence with regard to how legislators spend their time as well 
as to how they would like to spend their time.  Our findings have largely supported our 
argument.   
First, I discovered that, generally speaking, members of more professional state 
legislatures spent more time performing traditionally legislative activities and expressed 
that they would like to spend even more time performing those activities.  Essentially, the 
level of professionalism that exists in a legislature shapes membership, as legislators in 
more professional legislatures have more time to do things that they enjoy doing and 
spend less time performing activities they do not want to do.  For instance, they are able 
to spend more time meeting with citizens in their districts and participating in floor 
debates and less time working on building coalitions than legislators in less professional 
legislatures. 
 In addition, members with an eye on higher office spend time, and would ideally 
like to spend more time, on activities that will help them fulfill their ambitions.  When 
one examines how these legislators spend their time, it is clear that these legislators are 
focusing their efforts on activities that will reinforce their name recognition within their 
district (meeting citizens in their district) and expand their name recognition outside of 
their district (participating in agency oversight and giving speeches outside of their 
district).  With regard to how they would ideally like to spend their time, these ambitious 
legislators would also like to meet constituents at the capital and fundraise – activities 
which would again reinforce name recognition – and study legislation, which would 
make them a more knowledgeable, and theoretically more impressive, legislator. 
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Finally, we found that members that have accumulated longer tenure, and are thus 
more electorally secure, are able to spend more time engaging in the legislative activities 
they enjoy doing and less time in the activities they do not like to do.  For example, they 
are able to spend more time participating in floor debates, building coalitions, engaging 
in agency oversight, giving speeches outside of their district, and meeting in the capital 
on issues.  Because they have built up name recognition over time, they can afford to 
spend less time performing activities that more junior legislators would have to do, such 
as meeting citizens in their district and engaging in fundraising. 
There are four obvious extensions to this line of research.  The first step would be 
to determine if there are any psychological characteristics of these legislators that 
influence how they spend their time, or how they would like to spend their time.  The 
second extension would be to separate out legislators from various parts of the country to 
determine if regional effects exert any influence on legislative behavior.  A third 
improvement would be to separate activities into legislature-directed and constituent-
directed efforts to provide more specific results that align with the recent studies within 
the field. A final extension would involve deploying the survey again at multiple points 
in the future and conducting a time-series analysis to determine if professionalism, 
tenure, and ambition hold up as consistent predictors of how legislators like to spend their 
time over time. 
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APPENDIX 
 
 
SURVEY OF STATE LEGISLATORS 
 
 
1.  What is your party identification? 
 
      Democrat           Republican 
 
 
2.  How many years have you served in the state legislature? 
      
     2 or fewer            3-6            7-10            More than 10 
 
 
3.  Do you believe the compensation received by legislators in your state is adequate or 
inadequate? 
 
     Adequate           Inadequate 
 
 
4.  Do you believe the number of days your legislature spends in session is adequate or 
inadequate? 
 
     Adequate           Inadequate 
 
 
5.  Do you believe the number of staff working in your state is adequate or inadequate? 
 
     Adequate           Inadequate 
 
 
6.  Do you believe your state legislature is adequately professionalized, or would your 
state benefit from having a more professionalized legislature? 
 
 Adequately Professionalized           Would benefit from more professionalized legislature 
 
 
7.  What is your gender? 
 
     Male           Female 
 
8.  Which best describes your attitude toward seeking higher office in the future? 
 
     I would definitely like to run for higher office in the future 
 
     I might run for higher office in the future if the opportunity presented itself 
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I would not completely rule out running for higher office in the future, but am 
currently not interested 
 
     I would absolutely never run for higher office in the future 
 
9.  Do you serve in a leadership capacity in your state’s legislature? 
Yes    No 
10.  How much time do you spend engaging in _____? 
A great deal               A moderate amount               A little               Almost none 
Activities asked about:   
Meet Citizen in District          Meet Constituents at Capital           Fundraising    
Committee                         Meet at Capital on Issues           Study Legislation  
Work on Informal Causes       Floor Debate             Build Coalitions               
Agency Oversight             Speech out of District 
 
10.  Ideally, how much time would you like to spend engaging in _____?   
A great deal               A moderate amount               A little               Almost none 
Activities asked about:   
Meet Citizen in District          Meet Constituents at Capital           Fundraising    
Committee                         Meet at Capital on Issues           Study Legislation  
Work on Informal Causes       Floor Debate             Build Coalitions               
Agency Oversight             Speech out of District 
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